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The purpose of this MBA report is to explore and understand the issues involved 
in the DOD’s acquisition process for Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS) in order to 
recommend a new acquisition approach or solutions that would allow the military to keep 
pace with the rapid unmanned technology development cycle found in the commercial 
industry. We find that current UMS acquisitions are utilizing previous acquisition 
reforms, but could benefit from additional contractor peer competition and peer review. 
Additional cost and schedule benefits could result from contractor competition during 
build processes in each incremental process. We recommend that further analysis be 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. UNMANNED MARITIME VEHICLE ACQUISITION WITHIN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Today’s warfighter can employ a vast array of unmanned systems for on-field 
advantage. In many cases, the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) process allowed 
these systems to be quickly developed and employed. While this process made the 
systems more readily deployable, a consequence is that some of these programs have not 
undergone a thorough requirements review and coordination through the normal Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process. 
The Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap describes the full range of 
unmanned systems operated by the DOD, specifically that unmanned maritime systems 
(UMS) are divided into unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface 
vehicles (USVs), collectively known as unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs) 
(Department of Defense [DOD], 2011).  
The Navy currently has a number of UMS that perform a variety of missions 
including mine countermeasures, maritime security, hydrographic surveying, 
environmental analysis, special operations, and oceanographic research (see Figure 1) 
(DOD, 2011). The acquisition and subsequent delivery to the combatant commander 
requires an acquisition strategy that can keep up with the pace of technology 
development as well as capability requirements. 
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Figure 1.  Unmanned Maritime System Integration. Source: DOD (2011). 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis seeks to address the DOD’s process for acquiring new UMS, which 
has been unable to keep pace with commercial technology production. This is a problem 
because as the UMS acquisition cycle time increases when projects become Programs of 
Record (POR), as does cost. It appears the added bureaucracy of becoming a POR delays 
the delivery of the most current capabilities to the combatant commander. As a result of 
bureaucratic barriers, newer and potentially better technologies could become available 
first in the commercial industry and perhaps even to our adversaries. 
We propose that the reduced lifecycles of UMS compared to conventional 
weapons systems, as well as the increased technology refresh rate, places the UMS 
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spectrum of weapons systems on the cusp of the conventional acquisition process. A 
fresh approach to UMS acquisitions would be beneficial. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Which aspects of evolutionary acquisition should be included for UMS type 
acquisition programs to benefit from incremental, iterative acquisition models? 
D. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore and understand the issues involved in the 
DOD’s acquisition process for UMS weapons systems in order to recommend a new 
acquisition approach or solutions that would allow the military to keep pace with the 
rapid unmanned technology development cycle found in the commercial industry. This 
study is important because the DOD increasingly depends on unmanned systems in the 
undersea spectrum of warfare and the ability to refresh the capabilities, through a defined 
acquisition approach, provided by these systems is paramount. UMS provide the military 
with a competitive advantage in achieving dominance in the current and future undersea 
domain.  
E. POTENTIAL BENEFITS  
In this thesis, we present a better understanding of the problems within the DOD’s 
acquisition system and offer feasible solutions or recommendations for resolving 
requirements for systems that are not a direct fit for the current acquisition model. This 
thesis contributes to the DOD’s efforts in resolving the issues that continue to undermine 
rapidly evolving technology acquisition. The full range of DOD acquisition stakeholders 
could benefit from this research it explores new approaches to the acquisition process.  
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Nearly a decade ago, the need for a more streamlined approach to the DOD 
acquisition process became apparent in an attempt to quickly field evolving technologies. 
This thesis conducts an in-depth review of previous research, current program documents 
and discussions with subject matter experts in the acquisition of UUVs in an attempt to 
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provide recommendations tailored for the acquisition of quickly evolving UMS weapons 
systems.  
G. BACKGROUND  
To aid the understanding of the UMS acquisition issue, the remainder of this 
chapter presents an overview of the UMS systems and their acquisition associated 
history.  
1. MK-18 Mod 2 “Kingfish” 
The MK-18 Mod 2 was born out of the MK-18 Mod 1 program, so an overview of 
the MK-18 Mod 1 is warranted. The MK-18 Mod 1 “Swordfish” is an UUV that is based 
on the Hydroid Remote Environmental Monitoring System (REMUS) 100 platform (see 
Figure 2). The MK-18 Mod 1 is a “man-portable” vehicle that proved the viability of 
UUV operations during the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) by clearing large 
areas of the littoral battlespace in mainly the very shallow water region 10’-40’, (see 
Figure 3) and some parts of the shallow water region (Ervin, Madden, & Pollitt, 2014). 
  
Figure 2.  Mk-18 Mod 1 and Mod 2. Source: Ervin et al. (2014). 
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The increased endurance and autonomy of the UUV enabled the compression of 
timelines for operations at the start of OIF. The size and weight restrictions that increased 
the portability of the Swordfish also limited the endurance and capability with regards to 
power generation in support of sensors. An evolution of the system to the MK-18 Mod 2 
“Kingfish” was a simple matter of scaling. A side by side comparison is shown 
(see Figure 2). 
  
Figure 3.  Description of Littoral Areas. Source: Ervin et al. (2014). 
The MK 18 Mod 2 “Kingfish” is a larger version of the MK-18 Mod 1. The 21” 
diameter of the MK-18 Mod 2 technically places it in the “heavyweight” UUV category, 
but it is still deployable from an 11 meter rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB). The MK 18 
program is managed by SEA 06 – Expeditionary Missions (EXM) MCM Program Office 
(PMS 408). The system itself is a variant of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
Hydroid’s Remote Environmental Measuring Units (REMUS) 600 platform. This 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) vehicle has been adapted and upgraded for the MCM 
mission. This single-screw vehicle is 11.5 feet long, 12.75 inches in diameter, and weighs 
roughly 600 pounds. Primary mission areas for this system include intelligence 
preparation of the operational environment (IPOE), integrated fleet MCM, very shallow 
water (VSW) MCM, expeditionary port and harbor clearance operations, Maritime 
Homeland Defense (MHLD) response, and salvage operations support (Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations [OPNAV] Programming [N80], 2015). The MK-18 Mod 2 
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falls outside of the traditional acquisition framework due to the request from Command 
Fifth Fleet (C5F) for additional expeditionary underwater MCM capabilities. The “Fast 
Lane” program was established and funded by the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
to get the capabilities provided by the MK-18 Mod 2 into theatre as quickly as possible. 
The “Fast-Lane process worked and seven months later the first wave of MK-18 Mod 2s 
arrived in theatre (Ervin et al., 2014). 
The contractor provided a very large majority of maintenance and operator 
support for the UUVs both in and outside of the theatre and was also contracted for 
providing training to Navy EOD personnel. As the program matures more military 
personnel will assume operator and maintenance responsibilities, but contractor support 
is intended to shoulder a large portion of the maintenance and technology integration 
(Team UMS Cohort 311-1430, 2016). The MK-18 Mod 2 began as an Abbreviated 
Acquisition Program (AAP) and is transitioning to an ACAT-IVM POR. 
2. The Littoral Battlespace Sensing AUV  
The Littoral Battlespace Sensing (LBS) AUV is another system that has been 
developed from the Hydroid REMUS 600 platform. The LBS-AUV operates in 
conjunction with the LBS Gliders, built by Teledyne Brown Engineering, Inc. to 
comprise a completely integrated System of Systems (SoS) coined the Littoral 
Battlespace Sensing, Fusion and Integration (LBSF&I). While the LBS-AUV is a short 
duration autonomous vehicle, the LBS Glider is designed for longer durations of up to 30 
days from a lithium battery to ensure long-term data collection and subsequent 
transmission.  
The integration envisioned is summarized in the LBS AUV Statement of Work 
(SOW). The end result will be the collection of environmental data from the sea floor to 
the atmosphere, which will subsequently be transmitted to METOC data sites and fused. 
The collection, fusion, and automatic preparation of data will allow actionable and 
relevant information to the warfighter at the tactical as well as the strategic levels of war. 
These products are then integrated into Naval Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and Tactical 
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Decision Aid (TDA) systems as part of the Global Information Grid Enterprise Services 
(GIG-ES)/FORCEnet infrastructure (PMW 120, 2010). 
The MK-18 Mod 2 is designed as a standalone system deployed for specific 
missions and then subsequently recovered by a small detachment aboard a RHIB. The 
LBS-AUV is designed for a broader spectrum of missions and intentionally designed to 
be easily adaptable for a variety of future missions, as well as intentionally designed to be 
integrated into a networked SoS. While both of these programs are developed from the 
same commercial sole sourced platform, the REMUS 600, they were contracted for very 
different purposes.  
3. Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (LDUUV) 
Newest and largest of the UMS in development, the LDUUV shown (see 
Figure 4) has taken a decidedly different path to development. The 2004 UUV Master 
Plan laid out a vision for the modularity of the vehicle to increase as the size of the 
vehicle increased. This is realized in the desired end-state of the LDUUV. The LDUUV 
is a developmental large-displacement unmanned undersea vehicle. It will provide a new 
range of capabilities and longer range due to the larger size. The Program Executive 
Office Littoral Combat Ship (PEO LCS, 2015) states, “The system is being designed for 
intelligence, surveillance and mine countermeasure missions, and is based on a modular, 
open architecture that will allow the Navy to incrementally develop new mission sets for 
the craft” (para. 3). The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is designing the LDUUV to be 
the “truck” and allow the modularity of the vehicle to lend itself to packages that can be 
quickly interchanged. The packages can be exchanged as needed for a full spectrum of 
missions, and can advance with the maturation of technologies still in development. The 
LDUUV will be able to be employed by multiple-host platforms, to include submarines 
utilizing the Virginia Payload Module and the Ohio-class guided-missile submarines. The 
Unmanned Maritime Systems Program Office (PMS-406) which is part of the PEO LCS 
is developing the LDUUV (PEO LCS, 2015). 
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Figure 4.  LDUUV at Sea-Air-Space Exposition, 2015 
One unusual aspect of the LDUUV is the departure from the standard acquisition 
process. According to Naval Drones (2015), in 2012 ONR awarded Hydroid, the maker 
of the MK-18 series, a sole source $5.9 million contract to develop technologies for 
energy systems, littoral autonomy, and endurance. In 2012 and 2013, ONR awarded other 
multi-million dollar contracts to aid the development of fuel cell technologies, autonomy, 
and mission planning software to a variety of companies (Naval Drones, 2015). 
Naval Drones (2015) reported on the turbulent history of the LDUUV. In 2014, a 
Milestone A decision for the LDUUV was reached and the program was granted 
authority to move to the next phase of development. Following the Milestone A decision, 
a Request for Proposal (RFP) was released in preparation for a classified “industry day” 
for future development. The change in the LDUUV’s acquisition strategy came in March 
of 2016 when NAVSEA stated it would no longer solicit proposals from industry, but 
that Naval Undersea Warfare Command (NUWC) would lead the design and fabrication 
of the LDUUV prototypes (Naval Drones, 2015). 
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H. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS  
After this introduction, chapter II consists of a thorough literature review of the 
acquisition research conducted since 2009: government reports, academic papers, and 
proposed strategies for reforming the UMS acquisition system. Chapter III discusses 
acquisition reform efforts and current UMS acquisition systems. Chapter IV presents an 
analysis of both benefits and shortfalls of the current UMS acquisition process and looks 
at other potential solutions, offering a recommended approach to UMS acquisition. 
Finally, Chapter V closes the study with findings and recommendations, and conclusion. 
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter I discussed the background of three UUV programs and their differing 
acquisition models. The MK-18 MOD 2, which is focused on the mine countermeasure 
aspect of undersea warfare, has perhaps the most unique history with being rapidly placed 
in operation with the “Fast-Lane” initiative and the program’s subsequent recovery from 
this accelerated process to becoming an ACAT-IVM POR.  
The LBS-AUV is being designed from an SoS approach and interacts with the 
LBS-Gliders to collect and transmit data that is actionable to warfighters at the highest 
levels. The LBS-AUV, also based off the REMUS 600, has piggybacked off the 
operational fielding of the MK-18 Mod 2 is an ACAT-IVM program being tested in 
operational environments. The LDUUV is still in the prototype stage and is taking a 
different approach with its acquisition strategy in that the ONR has chosen to maintain 
the role as primary integrator. The three different programs are part of the UMS family, 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many references are available regarding the Department of Defense Acquisition 
system (DAS). The DAS is responsible for the supervision of the technological, 
programmatic and product support investment in support of the Department of Defense 
(DOD) (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD 
(AT&L)], 2007). The objective of the DAS is to acquire products that measurably 
improve mission capability while satisfying the needs of the end user (USD [AT&L]), 
2007). The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), under the 
auspices of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), employs a systematic 
method. The Defense Acquisition University (2013) states that JCIDS was established, 
“for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing gaps in joint warfighting capabilities and 
recommending potential solution approaches to resolve these differences” (Defense 
Acquisition University [DAU], 2013, p. 6). Through this process, the JCIDS develops an 
Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) that is published to support the material development 
process.  
The undersea domain is a warfare spectrum in which technological innovation 
and its acquisition plays an important role. This chapter provides an in-depth insight into 
the biggest problems surrounding UMS acquisition within the DOD. The key issues 
include: long developmental timelines, testing and evaluation problems, acquisition 
workforce, legislative impediment, oversight requirements, funding issues, and 
management problems. This chapter will provide a detailed text on these challenges that 
will compel the reader to explore possible remedies presented in the proceeding chapters. 
A. ISSUES WITHIN THE DOD ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
As earlier indicated, this chapter will address the problems, bottlenecks, and 
discontinuities within the system. To achieve this objective, this review will analyze the 
Packard Commission (1986) and Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 and highlight other 
pivotal items concerning DOD acquisitions.  
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1. 1986 Packard Commission 
In their article (Christensen, Searle, & Vickerey, 2015) explain that even with best 
intentions, administrative and regulatory implementation have failed to deliver the 
improvements the acquisition community has been seeking for more than three decades. 
The Packard Commission was created by Executive Order 12526 and commissioned by 
President Reagan to facilitate the study of a broad range of areas of management 
functionality within the DOD (Christensen et al., 2015). The 1986 Packard Commission 
was aimed at reducing inefficiencies in the procurement of defense systems. Despite the 
fact that the commission examined the management of defense practices, it placed an 
emphasis on the acquisition process. The commission concluded that the key problems 
with most acquisition processes had been identified previously: performance shortfalls, 
schedule delays, and cost growth (Christensen et al., 2015). The commission 
recommended simplifying the acquisition process, improving the planning process, 
prototyping, and testing. Changing the culture and adopting the competitive firm model 
were also recommended. 
2. Goldwater–Nichols Department of the Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986 
Some of the most revolutionizing changes made to the DOD, since the 1947 
National Security Act, came from the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986. It made the most 
significant changes to the DOD since the department’s establishment in 1947. The 
Goldwater–Nichols Act built on the Packard Commission and restructured the U.S. 
military’s command structure, placing the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant 
commanders in a more direct line with the President. The service chiefs’ new role 
became primarily to train and equip their forces for employment by the combatant 
commanders and to act as advisors to the SECDEF and President. In total, the act reduced 
bureaucratic redundancy and streamlined interoperability between the military 
components.  
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3. Better Buying Power  
 In his article, The Honorable Frank Kendall (2014) defined Better Buying Power 
(BBP) as the implementation of the best practices with an aim of strengthening DOD’s 
buying power, providing an affordable military capability to the Warfighter at a value, as 
well as improving industry productivity. Launched in the year 2010, Better Buying Power 
comprised a set of significant principles of acquisition towards the achievement of 
efficiencies by controlling cost, affordability, the elimination of bureaucracy, and 
promoting competition. Better Buying Power initiatives help in incentivizing innovation 
as well as productivity in government and industry, and improving tradecraft in the 
acquisition of services.  
4. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
A capabilities-based approach is how the Department of the Navy (DON) 
determines acquisition programs. SECNAVINST 5000.2E directs the roles and 
responsibilities as well as the processes to be used. The DON utilizes multiple processes 
that meld well with the joint process of JCIDS that is the formal DOD procedure (Office 
of the Secretary of the Navy [SECNAV], 2011). JCIDS evolved out of a previous process 
that allowed services to specify requirements. The JCIDS moves the requirement 
generation and validation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The capabilities and requirements 
delineated in this process aims to ensure the future needs of all four services are met. 
5. Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Policies and Procedures 
for Acquisition of UMS 
The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is structured to accomplish the National 
Security Strategy and support the DOD. The acquisition strategy of the DOD is targeted 
to provide for the current forces, but also the forces in the near and distant future. The 
primary purpose of DOD procurement is to support the end users. The support will 
continue to provide improved capabilities and support at a reasonable cost 
(USD[AT&L], 2007). 
In accordance with the House Armed Services Committee (HASC, 2010) report, 
the acquisition of weapon systems has, over the years, placed an emphasis on the 
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incorporation of technology into capital-intensive programs. These large technology 
dependent weapons systems result in remarkably long cycles of development. With 
respect to this view, it is worth noting that the burden of developing cutting edge 
technology will require the integration and development of an extended technology. 
Without the investment of large amounts of capital the desired requirements will not be 
met and the opportunity to develop and achieve them will be missed. As a result, the 
development cycle spurs competition, which leads to the creation of unneeded 
requirements on systems to reap scarce resources. 
6. House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition 
Reform Findings and Recommendations  
DOD acquisition efforts often focus on state-of-the art systems and system of 
systems. Capital equipment such as naval ships, aircraft, and vehicles are the primary cost 
drivers of weapon systems acquisition costs. These high-tech ambitions create an 
acquisition environment that demands lengthy technological development and 
integration. End users are savvy to the process involving capital-intensive systems and 
recognize requirement identification is a must in the beginning or risk losing capabilities 
on a piece of equipment. The HASC report identified cycles caused by the acquisition 
process with “two dynamics form a feedback loop wherein the pressure to enhance 
requirements extends development cycles and consumes resources, which increases the 
competition for resources, which increases the pressure to include additional 
requirements on systems in line to receive those scarce resources” (HASC, 2010, p. 7). 
The problems noted in these documents therefore affect the metrics of any 
acquisition procedure—namely, cost, performance and schedule. These issues of UMS 
acquisition fall under five problem areas or groups: workforce and management, 
oversight, funding and requirements, testing, and extended timelines 
a. Concerns within the Acquisition Workforce and Management 
The DOD Acquisition Workforce is tasked with procuring systems and services to 
meet military requirements within stipulated timelines to satisfy national security 
objectives (National Research Council [NRC], 2010). This UMS acquisition community 
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comprises many professional disciplines such as contracting officer, auditor, program 
management, test and evaluation, and UMS acquisition personnel. The workforce, 
therefore, requires highly qualified personnel, particularly in the fields of science, 
undersea warfare, engineering, testing, business, and program management. However, 
studies have indicated the existence of insufficient technical proficiency in the acquisition 
workforce and its future status due to relatively few personnel having the required 
expertise (NRC, 2010).  
Defense Science Board (DSB) (DOD, 2009) identifies the issues of cost, schedule 
and performance were due to deficiencies in the acquisition workforce. The workforce 
leadership lacked understanding, experience and had inadequate exposure to the 
acquisition processes. Many of the issues were caused from the complex bureaucratic 
processes where many unaccountable people must give approval before authority to 
proceed is granted. The major issue, however, was the lack of experience in the 
acquisition profession.  
Leadership is a key requirement, in addition to specific and extensive technical 
knowledge, when developing, implementing, and managing the acquisition process of 
UMS systems. These requirements are paramount at the DOD level, and the Services, to 
give the managers the ability to provide oversight and decision-making at different 
milestones (DOD, 2009). The deficiency in requisite knowledge and skills in UMS 
acquisition is mainly due to lack of trained staff in the acquisition community. According 
to the DSB (2009), concern for the viability of a continued stream of home grown 
engineering and science students is elevating into a national security problem 
(DSB, 2009). 
Acquisition personnel need experience, and that takes time. Frank Kendall (2012) 
stated that at the end of the day the capability of a workforce and professionalism and 
how they are supported significantly affect the acquisition results. In addition, Frank 
Kendall (2012) confirmed that when an organization develops its program managers, 
chief managers, workforce, the logistic specialist, and the private support staff, they may 
not have a shortfall at any given time. In contrast a shortfall of these key individuals will 
result in a very long recovery time for correcting errors (Fryer-Biggs, 2012). 
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Historically, and still today, DOD agencies have had to govern complex roles and 
responsibilities regarding the management of the acquisition system (DSB, 2009). This 
may occur because authority in the DOD is contained in several different organizations, 
which reduces coordination and/or synchronization. Even though the Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) seems to maintain 
control over acquisition, the Secretary of Defense has many on his staff that contribute to 
the decision process. These agencies serve separate functions and provide different 
services within the DOD. According to Congress, these offices were often not aligned 
and it is unclear if these organizations are serving with a common focus toward 
improving the acquisition process (DSB, 2009). 
b. Issues in Oversight 
Supervisors throughout the DOD are in place in order to lead and manage 
complex systems and organizations; this holds true for the acquisition community as well 
(NRC, 2010). Many entities throughout the government exercise oversight processes. 
These entities may consist of acquisition officials, DOD, and even Congress. The role 
Congress plays in the acquisition process is by the authorization and appropriation of 
funds and enacting laws that govern procurement. Each party can produce demands on 
the acquisition process during their oversight. With multiple oversight bodies monitoring 
and reviewing the program, the acquisition system gives additional attention to parties 
that often are not stakeholders (e.g., end users) in the process (NRC, 2010). This 
instability can have tremendous effects on the program. 
Too much oversight can delay or obstruct the acquisition of UMS. In 2009 the 
Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Panel stated, “Current governance 
structure does not promote program success—actually, programs advance in spite of the 
oversight process rather than because of it” (DSB, 2009, pg. 59). Monitoring is intended 
to be beneficial, yet some controlling bodies are so burdensome that they delay programs 
and actually increase the likelihood of failure (Gilligan, Heitkamp, & McCoy, 2009). 
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c. Requirements and Funding Issues 
The most important part of the acquisition process, requirements determination, 
outlines end user needs and expectations and sets in place the purpose and outline of the 
acquisition program. Requirements can be described as either essential requirements 
(Big-R) or detailed requirements (Small-r). The “Big-R” requirements are a broader 
range of understood capabilities and the product expected from employing those 
capabilities (NRC, 2010). In contrast, “Small-r” requirements are more detailed and focus 
on specifics for the user and their utilities and interfaces required. Needs such as the 
ability to prioritize logistics requests based on time or unit (NRC, 2010). Essential and 
detailed requirements have equal priority and can cause issues within the acquisition 
process. 
Problems involving conditions lengthen the UMS acquisition process. As 
illustrated previously, too many specific requirements placed on UMS acquisition 
programs by multiple parties can cause friction in the process. Further, the requirements 
specified often contain poor or incorrect descriptions of the end user needs. These 
inaccuracies in the requirements cause issues when the budget has been authorized, yet a 
new need or requirement is discovered. The current process is also inflexible and 
vulnerable to over-specification of requirements. 
Another concern closely related to conditions is contained in the funding process 
for UMS acquisition. The acquisition process typically takes years and does not support a 
suitable solution that is needed for short lifecycle and high technology turnover systems 
such as the AUV/UUV. The DOD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
(PPBE) system is the source of the problem, yet is a necessary evil. The budgeting 
process begins two years in advance due to the complex requirements to receive 
authorization and appropriation of funding from Congress. The PPBE process offers little 
in the way of flexibility.  
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d. Issues in Testing and Evaluation  
DOD 5000.01 stresses that the integration of the evaluation and testing is a 
priority throughout the acquisition process. However, in traditional acquisition process, 
key stakeholders are required to understand the depth and breadth of testing requirements 
in an effort to ensure testing requirements are necessary and meet the full spectrum of 
needs. Testing issues are often identified too late in traditional acquisition practices. 
Programs involving new technology rely heavily on user feedback. These reviews from 
the end user can be interpreted and incorporated in the form of new elements or better 
design. Continuous testing can actually decrease development time by reducing redesign 
once problems are discovered. Also, unnecessary testing can cost time, money, and cause 
delays. In reference to COTS technologies, they are not tested effectively, overly tailored, 
and unduly delayed, according to the National Research Council (NRC, 2010).  
e. Problems Due to Long Acquisition Lifecycles 
DOD systems are not as timely despite the rate of advancement in automation, 
which strains the acquisition processes (DSB, 2009). Notwithstanding, military 
operations are requiring a more direct path into theater (DSB, 2009). The DOD utilizes an 
acquisition process that involves disjointed parts and processes prone to errors that are 
unnecessary for UMS acquisition. One major point of failure can occur at milestone 
decision points. Milestones are critical junctures in every acquisition program where a 
program must be approved at multiple levels of bureaucracy. The process has a great 
potential to stall at milestone decision points. The review process for a major decision 
point can take up to 90 days (DSB, 2009). These delays differentiate the existing process 
from commercial best practices (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2012). 
B. ACQUISITION REFORMS: 1980S TO PRESENT 
There have been issues in the DOD acquisition system for great length of time, 
and both the DOD and congress have acknowledged the need for reform as evidenced by 
number of commissions and legislative acts that have occurred. The Packard Commission 
and Blue Ribbon Commission, as well as many other studies, have informed the DOD of 
the shortcomings of the acquisition system. These two prominent commissions and the 
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other studies have initiated changes to policy and process. Technology advancement in 
the commercial sector has been a key driving factor in acquisition reform (Burch-
Bynum, 2013). 
As Allen and Eide explain in their 2012 journal article, acquisition reform in the 
early 1980s occurred due to fraud, waste, and abuse. The authors further explain that the 
Blue Ribbon Commission responded to these issues with new legislation that included the 
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. In regard to DOD, the Blue 
Ribbon Commission found that diluted authority of execution existed within the 
Department, so a major restructuring ensued as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to 
include the creation of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
(Allen & Eide, 2012).  
The Blue Ribbon Commission introduced further reform recommendations that 
changed how the DOD conducted business, commercialized its procedures, and viewed 
its human capital. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 
1990 was created to improve the quality of the acquisition workforce. DAWIA 
established requirements for education along with career paths for the acquisition 
workforce. Further, program execution would now be managed by Integrated Product 
Teams (IPTs) using the process of Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) 
and the strategy of Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) utilized to limit the growth 
of associated costs (Allen & Eide, 2012).  
The 1990s continued the reform efforts with: The Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act of 1994, the Clinger Cohen Act of 1996, and the 1996 change to the 
Brooks Act of 1965. The Federal Streamlining Act made commercial, off-the-shelf 
products more readily available to government users (Allen & Eide, 2012). In 1996, there 
was a significant change to the 1965 Brooks Act regarding information technology which 
has a short lifecycle and rapid technological refresh rate—much like the UMS of today.   
Ultimately, the Federal Streamlining Act and the Clinger Cohen Act improved 
acquisition outcomes by reducing government barriers to the procurement process and 
encouraging commercial innovation (Allen & Eide, 2012). In 1997, Secretary of Defense 
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William Cohen created the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). The DRI espoused adopting 
commercial methods of business, maximizing synergy by eliminating redundancy, 
reducing costs and improving quality through competition, and eliminating excess 
structures in order to free resources (Allen & Eide, 2012). The DOD acquisition 
community adopted a more business mindset to fixing acquisition issues, which carried 
over into the next century.  
The DOD continued to revolutionize the way it conducted business with the move 
to net-centric operations in the early 2000s. The USD (AT&L) Jacques Gansler had a 
great deal of significance on this revolution which persists to the present day. Gansler 
utilized the lessons learned from the Congressional studies and sought to change 
acquisitions for the long-term. The new direction wanted to reduce development times for 
new weapons systems, reduce costs, and realize savings through efficiencies and 
maximizing flexibility with appropriately sized infrastructure and workforce (Gansler, 
2000). Gansler sought to introduce training of the acquisition workforce in commercial 
business practices, place cost and schedule above performance, and integrate the 
uniformed personnel of the military with their civilian counterparts (Allen & Eide, 2012). 
These priorities did not have UMS in mind, but they related to UMS too. Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld believed that network-centric capabilities were more important to 
future conflict than the traditional legacy systems (Adler, 2007). Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld strived for the DOD to seek innovative solutions from nontraditional defense 
industries. 
The DOD and Congress began to question the acquisition system by 2005 and felt 
the acquisition system was not working as desired, even with all of the recent reforms 
(Kadish, Abbott, Cappuccio, Hawley, Kern, & Kozlowski, 2006). Due to this lack of 
confidence in the system, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) 
Project was created. In 2006, DAPA conducted an overall assessment of the entire 
acquisition process. One of the major findings was that complexity and the extent of the 
oversight were affecting schedule and cost (Allen & Eide, 2012). The additional laws and 
regulations, while intended to aid the process, actually made it more cumbersome and 
costly. The NDAAs of 2005, 2007, and 2009 held too many ambiguities and actually 
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stifled innovation and flexible responses instead of creating it. The same ambiguities 
actually led to more structure, documentation and subsequent cost increases (Gansler & 
Lucyshyn, 2012). Goldwater-Nichols, Clinger Cohen and the federal laws that resulted 
complicated the acquisition process and caused redundancies between the USD (AT&L), 
the Department’s CIO, and the Deputy Chief Management Officer.  
Since 2008 more acquisition reform initiatives have been instituted; however, 
some were not thorough enough in terms of allowing the flexible structure needed for 
UMS acquisitions. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates began his own version of needed 
acquisition reform by completing an overhaul of the DOD’s approach to acquisition 
(Gates, 2009). Gates illustrated that in the face of budget reductions and diminishing 
economic resources, further shifts were needed in the acquisition community. Program 
managers must be able to cut failing programs as needed, requirements must be carefully 
evaluated to avoid overruns in schedule and cost, and proper staffing for oversight was 
required. Cost estimates needed to be more realistic, and to ensure stability in the 
programs the budgets must be protected (Allen & Eide, 2012).  
The road to acquisition reforms within the federal government and the DOD 
began nearly 30 years ago and much has been done to identify the problems, implement 
solutions, and execute reform actions. Most reform efforts appear to initiate a return to 
the conclusion that more reform is needed. It is necessary to turn our attention to the 
current acquisition process and how it has been affected by these latest reform efforts 
(Burch-Bynum, 2013). 
C. THE PRESENT DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM (DAS) 
The DAS is published in DOD’s 5000 Series, DODD 5000.01 and DODI 
5000.02. The management of the DOD system is a complex synchronization between 
three interdependent processes: requirements, budgets, and procurements (Gansler & 
Lucyshyn, 2012). These three processes are meant to operate separately and together in 
order to meet DOD objectives. The requirements for an acquisition program are defined 
in the JCIDS. This process also enables evaluation criteria for the program. The 
budgeting process allocates and manages the funds that congress authorizes for the 
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development and procurement of acquisition programs. The DAS is the final step in the 
acquisition process and is the actual procurement process utilized to provide material 
capabilities to the end user (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2015). In order 
to achieve a successful program all three aspects of the process must be fulfilled in total.  
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) must follow the DAS framework 
over each program’s lifespan, from planning through maintenance (GAO, 2013). Five 
lifecycle phases (Figure 5) including five decision points give the process its basic 
structure.  Milestones A, B, and C are three key review points at development stages, 
while another decision point occurs at the onset, or materiel development decision, and 
near the end of the lifecycle with the decision to initiate full deployment of the project 
(indicated in Figure 5 by white triangles) (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2015a). The materiel 
development decision provides officials authority to conduct an Analyses of Alternatives 
(AoA). The AoA assesses potential solutions that can satisfy the program’s requirements. 
The Full Deployment Decision (FDD) is the last step that enables the deployment of the 
program (GAO, 2013). For programs that are required to use this framework, the 
milestone decision authority (MDA) will either be the USD (AT&L); the DOD 
component head; a component acquisition executive (CAE); or when authorized, a 





Figure 5.   Illustration of the Interaction between the Capability Requirements 
Process and the Acquisition Process. Source: USD(AT&L) (2015a). 
The Defense Acquisition Framework consists of the following phases as depicted 
in Figure 5: 
• Materiel Solution Analysis: Refine the initial system solution (concept); and 
to create a strategy for acquiring the solution. A decision is made at the end of 
this phase to authorize acquisition of the program-referred to as milestone A. 
• Technology Development: Determine the appropriate set of technologies to be 
integrated into the system solution while simultaneously refining user 
requirements. A decision is made at the end of this phase to authorize product 
development based on well- defined technology and a reasonable system 
design plan—referred to as milestone B…The first APB is established after 
the program has assessed the viability of various technologies and refined user 
requirements to identify the most appropriate technology solution that 
demonstrates that it can meet users’ needs.   
• Engineering and Manufacturing Development. Develop a system and 
demonstrate through developer testing that the system can function in its 
target environment. A decision is made at the end of this phase to authorize 
entry of the system into the production and deployment phase or into limited 
deployment in support of operational testing—referred to as milestone C. 
[Low-rate initial production (LRIP) is authorized post milestone C to support 
operational testing.] 
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• Production and Deployment. During this phase, the system is produced, 
operationally tested, and deployed. At this point, the system achieves an 
operational capability that satisfies the end-users needs, as verified through 
independent operational testing and evaluation, and is implemented at all 
applicable locations. 
• Operations and Support. This is the final phase. Program personnel ensure that 
the system is sustained in the most cost-effective manner over its lifecycle. 
(GAO, 2013, p. 7–8) 
The acquisition system is designed to ensure needs or requirements are transferred 
into stable and affordable acquisition programs and have been fairly successful at 
producing the more traditional weapons systems (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2012). The 
traditional Defense Acquisition Systems framework is complex and its phases do not 
conform well to commercial industry best practices or adapting COTS products.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The issues of UMS acquisition fall under five problem areas or groups, namely, 
Acquisition Workforce and Management Issues, Legislative Impediment and Oversight 
Issues, Requirements and Funding Issues, Testing and Evaluation Issues, and Issues 
Extending from Lengthy Acquisition Timelines. It has also been noted that too much 
oversight can be a barrier in the acquisition of UMS. Although monitoring is intended to 
be a good thing, some control entities are so burdensome that they slow programs down 
and even increase the probability of failure.  
The history of acquisition reform and the workforce that comprises it was 
discussed from 1980 to present day. The need for reform was acknowledged since the 
early 1980s. The Packard Commission along with the Blue Ribbon Commission helped 
to identify some of the downfalls of the legacy system and aided the implementation of 
reform initiatives to include the creation of the position Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition. The reform initiatives continued through the 1990s. The Clinger Cohen Act 
and the Federal Streamlining Act helped to greatly reduce the bureaucracy that was 
previously in place in the acquisition world. This reduction was assisted by the Secretary 
of Defense with the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) which identified four pillars of 
reform which helped the DOD to approach acquisition from a business minded entity. 
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The 2000s saw continued emphasis on improvement in the acquisition community that 
focused on being net-centric, reducing total cost, and training the acquisition workforce.  
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III. DATA: CURRENT UMS ACQUISITION MODELS: 
MK-18 MOD 2, LBS-AUV, LDUUV 
A. MK-18 MOD 2 
Having outlined the role of the Department of Defense Acquisition System (DAS) 
in the previous chapter, we now discuss the beginning of the acquisition process of the 
Underwater Unmanned Vehicle (UUV) and specifically the MK-18 Mod 2. This section 
provides a broad insight into the whole process of the acquisition and the perennial 
success of the MK-18 Mod 2 implementation in various missions. 
Early stages of the acquisition of the MK-18 Mod 2 began in December 2011 
when the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved a “Fast Lane Initiative” to provide 
the MK-18 Mod 2 Kingfish UUV and associated sensors and upgrades to the Commander 
5th Fleet (C5F) on an accelerated basis (Ervin et al., 2014). The “Fast Lane Initiative” is 
an initiative which the DAS, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense, adopted to 
field key components of the MK-18 UUV in order to accelerate the transition of existing 
and planned MK-18 Mod 2, families of systems, to meet the operational needs in the 
Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). This initiative has resulted in improved 
operational mine countermeasure mission (MCM) and advanced sensors. 
Through the “Fast Lane Initiative", the first batch of the MK-18 Mod2 Kingfish 
UUVs was delivered in July 2012 to the C5F AOR to begin the search, classification and 
map missions in the Middle East. Subsequent second and third batches were delivered in 
February 2013 and October 2013 respectively. In February 2014 and April 2014 the MK-
18 Mod 2 Kingfish UUVs were put into an operational environment and proved its 
capabilities.   
The MK-18 has recorded a significant number of successes including being 
deployed to the Gulf of Mexico for a mock test and it has replaced the MK-18 Mod 1 in 
the Persian Gulf as an answer to the continued need in the AOR. The MK-18 Mod 2 has a 
wider swath scan, higher resolution imagery and buried target detection making it more 
versatile than the previous Mod 1. The success of the MK-18 Mod 2 can be attributed to a 
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technologically mature design and outstanding contractor support, for both operational 
and maintenance support.  
The MK-18 Mod 2 vehicle is based on the REMUS 600 platform. The state of the 
vehicle’s development has provided us an autonomous UUV that matches the vision  
stated in the DOD Roadmap for Unmanned Systems, with “the seamless integration of 
diverse unmanned capabilities that provide flexible options…persistence, size, speed, 
maneuverability, and reduced risk to human life” (DOD, 2011, p.3). The MK-18 Mod 2 
transitioned from an Abbreviated Acquisition Program (AAP) to a Program of Record 
(POR) in 2015 in order to meet future defense operation requirements. The MK-18 Mod 
2 entered the JCIDS process as an ACAT IVM POR and “Increment 1” is intended to 
achieve Milestone C in November of 2017 (Simmons, 2015). 
B. LITTORAL BATTLESPACE SENSOR (LBS) 
The REMUS 600 began development in 2003 at the Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institute. The crossover of the MCM to the larger vehicle as a simple scaling issue, yet 
this would leave a gap in the capabilities outlined in “The Navy Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan of 2004” and successive documents. 
The LBS addresses the sub-pillars of ISR, Oceanography, and 
Communication/Navigation Network Node, through the Gliders. The term intelligence 
preparation of the environment (IPOE) is utilized while defining the LBS-Glider/AUV 
SoS. The 2015 U.S. Navy Program Guide describes the LBS capabilities with, “Critical 
to realizing undersea dominance, the system has delivered buoyancy-driven undersea 
gliders (LBS-G) and electrically powered, autonomous undersea vehicles (LBS-AUV) to 
enable anti-submarine, mine countermeasures, expeditionary, and naval special warfare 
planning and execution and persistent intelligence preparation of the environment 
(IPOE)” (U.S. Navy [USN], 2015). 
Utilizing the previous development completed by the operational fielding of the 
MK-18 Mod 2 in the Central Command AOR the LBS-AUV was able to demonstrate a 
more mature system and enter later in the JCIDS process. The LBS-AUV completed its 
Critical Design Review (CDR) in 2011 and went on to meet the Milestone C 
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requirements in 2012 and continue with Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP). The LBS-
AUV was deemed Initial Operationally Capable (IOC) IN 2013 and delivered seven 
vehicles in 2014.  
C. LARGE DISPLACEMENT UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE 
(LDUUV) 
The LDUUV, unlike the smaller MK-18 and LBS-AUV, is still developmental. 
The LDUUV, due to its size, has not been as commercially viable and is a more “typical” 
DOD product in that it has a much more military specific character. The 2015 Navy 
Program Guide describes the mission of the LDUUV with “the Large Displacement 
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle will provide a robust, long endurance, persistent, multi-
mission, unmanned undersea vehicle capability for the Navy” (USN, 2015). 
The missions that will be required of the LDUUV will require a larger energy 
source and modularity not required of the smaller UUVs. The LDUUV is larger in order 
to meet the many sub-pillars outlined in the 2004 UUV master plan of persistent ISR, 
ASW Hold at Risk, Long Range Oceanography, and payload delivery (Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy [DASN], 2004).  
The development of the LDUUV is not a stop gap measure, but is instead 
intended to jump ahead of the curve and help to define the future battlefield. The 
LDUUV is being developed under the Innovative Naval Prototype (INP) program which 
was founded in FY 2011. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) website describes the 
INP program as one that attempts to anticipate the nation’s need by developing high-
payoff, high-risk, game-changing, emerging technologies that define our future 
battlespace. INP programs are disruptive technologies which carry high risks and require 
high level leadership support in order to survive (Office of Naval Research 
[ONR], 2016). 
 The LDUUV achieved Milestone A in 2014 and was progressing in a more 
traditionally open market competitive acquisition framework until early in 2016. In 
March of 2016 it was announced that Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Newport Rhode 
Island would be the government system integrator for the LDUUV and the acquisition 
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plan for the LDUUV had been revised. Lee Hudson of “Inside Defense” quoted an email 
from Naval Sea Systems Command which described how ONR is attempting to expedite 
the maturation of technology readiness and deliver the latest technology to the Fleet with 
their government-led design approach while at the same time reducing risk 
(Hudson, 2016a).  
This level of risk, as mentioned above, requires senior level sponsorship. The 
level of sponsorship is not always carried over into the House or Senate appropriations. 
Both the House and Senate cut funding for the projects from the President’s budget 
proposal. The House cut $43 million and the Senate cut $55 million from the President’s 
request of $57 million (Hudson, 2016b). 
The 2015 Program Guide says, “The Navy will achieve an early operational 
capability in FY 2017 by converting three ONR LDUUV INP vehicles into user 
operational evaluation systems to begin development of tactics, techniques and 
procedures. LDUUV initial operational capability is expected in FY 2022” (USN, 2015). 
The proposed cut in requested funding will undoubtedly have an effect on technology 
maturation and fielding of the INP vehicles, thus affecting the schedule and risking cost 
increases to the program.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter identified the current acquisition models for the three different 
UUVs.  The MK-18 Mod 2 was a follow-up to the smaller MK-18 Mod 1 and was 
introduced to the operational environment via the “Fastlane Initiative” and is now an 
ACAT IVM POR. THE LBS-AUV utilizes the same base hardware as the MK-18 Mod 2 
and due to performance demonstrated has been able to enter as an ACAT IVM POR 
record and achieved a Milestone C decision in 2011. The LDUUV was reviewed due to 
its status as a prototype and the non-traditional approach to acquisition that is being taken 
by ONR and the subsequent lack of funding by congress. 
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IV. ANALYSIS: MODELS ADAPTABLE FOR UMS 
The Department of Defense employs various broadly based procurement models 
that close gaps present in traditional acquisition models. These baseline models are 
recommendations, but each acquisition program is unique and should have a tailored 
strategy (USD[AT&L], 2015a). 
The Department of Defense utilizes six program models framing its acquisition 
process (USD[AT&L], 2015a).These program standards are outlined in DOD Instruction 
(DODI) 5000.02. Among the six models, four models are considered basic. These four 
basic models are structured to the type of product being acquired or to the requirement 
for accelerated acquisition: Defense Unique Software Intensive Program, Hardware 
Intensive Program, Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive Program, and Accelerated 
Acquisition program. The remaining two models are hybrids, merging the features of 
complex and basic models and are usually modified to the dominant attribute of the end 
product. The hybrid models are the Hardware Dominant hybrid model and the Software 
Dominant hybrid model. The Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive Program and 
the Software Dominant hybrid model will be examined as these effectively apply to the 
acquisition of the majority of UMS. 
A. MODEL 3: INCREMENTALLY DEPLOYED SOFTWARE INTENSIVE 
PROGRAM. 
The schematic representation of the Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive 




Figure 6.  Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive Program. 
Source: USD(AT&L) (2015a). 
The Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive model offers rapid delivery of 
capability through several limited deployments, as opposed to the Defense Unique 
Software Intensive Program’s single cycle of milestone B and C review points leading to 
one production run. As DODI 5000.02 explains, “Each increment may have several 
limited deployments; each deployment will result from a specific build and provide the 
user with a mature and tested sub-element of the overall incremental capability” 
(USD[AT&L], 2015a, p. 11). In this model, several builds and deployments are usually 
required in satisfying accepted necessities for an increment of competence (USD[AT&L], 
2015a). This model is typically useful in cases where COTS software are acquired and 
adapted for DOD uses. The Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive model can offer 
risk to timeline as it features recurrent milestone or fielding decision points and detailed 
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endorsement reviews. The issue of associated cycle time incurred with these reviews and 
the recent improvements made was outlined in the 2015 annual report on the performance 
of defense acquisition system. The annual report responds that initiatives have created to 
limit the review process in the OSD to less than 14 days, and has implemented a 
coordinating tool to allow for parallel reviews (USD[AT&L], 2015b). The Incrementally 
Deployed Software Intensive model is suitable for weapon systems software that reaches 
full capacity after multiple 1- to 2-year cycles. 
B. MODEL 6: HYBRID PROGRAM B (SOFTWARE DOMINANT) 
The schematic representation of the hybrid program B (Software Dominant) is 
shown in Figure 7. 
 




Figure 7 illustrates how software-intensive products can consist of a combination 
of incremental software upgrades or releases containing standard builds in order to 
continue product development. In this program model, highly integrated and 
sophisticated software and hardware development risks require proper management 
throughout the product lifecycle (DAU, 2013). The program also requires special interest 
at decision points and milestones. Another fundamental characteristic of the Software 
Dominant model is that it includes all the features found in the Incrementally Deployed 
Software Intensive Program.  
Both the Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive and Software Dominant 
model begin with a materiel development decision that is based on the ICD or similar 
document, the completion of an Analysis of Alternatives study guidance and study plan. 
In both models, the materiel development decision initiates the execution of the AoA and 
permits the DOD component to perform the Materiel Solution Analysis. The second 
phase in both models is the Materiel Solution Analysis stage. The Materiel Solution 
Analysis is necessary in choosing the product concept to be acquired as well as initiating 
validated capability loopholes into system specific requirements. Both of these processes 
support the decision on the acquisition strategy for the product. 
After the Materiel Solution Analysis, the procurement process paves the way for 
the Milestone A decision. At this point, the team seeks approval for the program to enter 
the technology maturation and risk reduction phase for the dominant software model and 
the risk reduction phase for the Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive Model 
(Ryan, 2016). The responsible DOD component may issue contracts for product delivery 
at this stage.  
In the Software Dominant model, the acquisition process enters the Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development phase after Milestone B, authorizing the relevant DOD 
component to award contracts. In the Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive Model, 
the acquisition process enters the Development and Fielding phase—meaning that the 
product can be deployed at this stage. 
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The acquisition process includes a Milestone C decision or a FDD. At this stage; 
the process is reviewed for entry into the production and deployment phase. It is 
imperative that the management team conducts demonstrations to prove the stability of 
output and deployment. After full deployment, the product enters the Sustainment 
Operations and Support phase in both models. The Sustainment Operations and Support 
phase executes product support strategies in a bid to satisfy material readiness, 
performance requirements of operations support, and sustainment throughout a 
program’s lifecycle. 
Considering the rapid changes in technology and the dynamic development of 
UUVs, the Software Dominant model is not the most suitable model for the acquisition of 
UUV systems. This is because the Software Dominant model keeps track of minor 
changes in technology and allows the product under consideration to pass through a 
series of sophisticated analysis stages in the acquisition process. This requires significant 
program manager involvement to manage this complex model. The Incrementally 
Deployed Software Intensive model does not include an engineering and manufacturing 
development phase but instead jumps to deployment after the risk reduction phase. 
Engineering and manufacturing development is not particularly fundamental for 
autonomous systems due to the selection of COTS products. This is highlighted in the 
LBS-UUV in which an industry analysis was performed that indicated several 
commercially available UUV products were available. A low risk was assigned for 
delivering required capabilities within cost and schedule (PMW 120, 2009). The 
Software Dominant model involves more steps and milestone decisions which increase 
the length of time in the acquisition process. The Incrementally Deployed Software 
Intensive Model should, therefore, be adopted for the acquisition of unmanned 
underwater vehicle systems.  
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C. INCREMENTALLY DEPLOYED SOFTWARE INTENSIVE 
APPLICATION 
As covered in chapter two of this document, the reformation of the acquisition 
community and the requirements that govern DOD acquisitions allowed the streamlining 
of the DOD’s acquisition process. While the JCIDS process is still a complicated system 
to navigate, it is functional and allows the acquisition workforce to develop, deploy, and 
maintain extremely complicated weapons systems while mitigating risks to schedule and 
cost.  
The MK-18 Mod 2 is the most successful UUV that this report has covered. The 
MK-18 Mod 2, while previously an AAP, has been able to transition to an ACAT IVM 
POR. The current acquisition strategy is for the MK-18 Mod 2 to be developed in three 
increments utilizing the evolutionary approach (H. Williams, personal communication, 
October 20, 2016). The evolutionary method is becoming the preferred method for many 
acquisition programs utilizing mature technology. Utilizing mature technology mitigates 
risk in the program, and allows the product to move through the JCIDS process more 
readily. This benefit is demonstrated by the development process of MK-18 Mod 2 and 
the LBS-AUV, as both were able to enter at the post-Milestone B decision (Simmons, 
2015; USN, 2015).  
Not all UMS programs will possess the level of mature technology as in the MK-
18 Mod 2 and the LBS-AUV. The LDUUV is a prime example of this. The LDUUV is an 
INP program and as stated by ONR, an INP program “attempts to anticipate the nation’s 
need by developing high-payoff, high-risk, game-changing, emerging technologies that 
define our future battlespace” (ONR, 2016). The LDUUV is not a COTS program, and 
similarities with the MK-18 family of UUVs are few. Due to the size and development of 
cutting edge technology the LDUUV is more specialized and military specific in mission. 
The LDUUV is scheduled to achieve initial operational capability in FY 2022, but will 
place three prototypes in operational testing in 2017 (USN, 2015). 
Not all UMS are adaptable to the evolutionary acquisition model. The DODI 
5000.02 illustrates the approach with Figure 6, the Incrementally Deployed Software 
Intensive model. For the MK-18 Mod 2 and LBS-AUV programs the Incrementally 
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Deployed Software Intensive model is a better fit for their development and fielding. 
Much of the REMUS 600 hardware has been unchanged over the past decade. It is the 
development of the software, or additional plug-and-play hardware such as SONAR that 
will be utilized in future versions and are planned for the follow-on increments. All of the 
successive hardware and software updates must meet the approved requirements. The 
model shown in Figure 6 allows this development to occur in an incremental and iterative 
process while at the same time providing the capability of the program to the end user. 
D. BUILDING A UMS MODEL: SOFTWARE DOMINANT  
The commencement of the POR begins with a defined need. Once it has been 
determined that no program currently exists to meet that need, a new program is created 
and a list of capability requirements generated. These capability requirements are not 
expected to remain constant and although the requirements are known, the technology 
may not exist to achieve the required capability. The incremental acquisition process 
allows the introduction of operational systems that can achieve a portion of the 
requirements and allow the continued development of future capabilities utilizing the 
same base platform. 
As the list of requirements is developed and ready capabilities identified, the 
increments of evolutionary acquisitions take shape. The mature technology will be 
incorporated into the first increment of the program. Future increments will incorporate 
technology that is in development, but not yet proven in an operational environment.  
Although the evolutionary acquisition model has evolved to expedite the implementation 
of current technology into the operational environment for the end user, the requirements 
for each increment must be established prior to Milestone C (USD[AT&L], 2015a).The 
period between increments introduces an artificial lull in the technology maturation time 
and the deployment of units to the end user. This period also allows the program 
managers the ability to update capabilities for future increments. 
As shown in Figure 6, pre-planned builds can be executed during the OT&E 
phase. This would allow the implementation of a “build-test-refine-deploy” process in 
which the latest software updates are being implemented in units in an operational 
 38 
environment. The subsequent fixes are either rolled into the next build or the update is 
planned into that build timeframe. This implementation of build stages also allows the 
planning of capability documents for the follow-on increments and the subsequent 
maturation of the program capabilities. UMS dependence on software for autonomy, 
communications, data processing, power usage, and the seamless integration that 
corresponds to these tasks is in a continuous update cycle and the quicker the product 
improvement cycle, the quicker the development and deployment of capabilities 
(USD[AT&L], 2015a). 
1. Competition 
Many military solutions require the development of technology, or a capability, 
that raises the classification level beyond the affordability of many potential DOD 
business partners. In the case of UMS, much of the software is available in industry and 
competition is available. The implementation of competition in UMS development will 
be key to progressing past the current state of capability.  
The use of competition in the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) on 
submarine SONAR systems is often used as a model to demonstrate the implementation 
of Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) and the benefits of competition in the 
rapid achievement of capabilities for a program (Boudreau, 2006). By ensuring that the 
systems of the UMS are open, this allows multiple competitors to compete for the next 
build. The LBS-UUV program has embraced both the evolutionary acquisition approach 
and the use of MOSA to deliver capabilities while reducing cost (PMW 120, 2011). In 
the case of the MK-18 Mod 2, the use of the Common Operator Interface Navy-EOD 
(COIN) allowed the operators to have a common application that spanned multiple types 
of UUVs. This common interface provides consistency amongst the operators and yet 
allows the open system for the specific UUV mission functions. As Ervin states, “The 
program manager decreed that for any UUV manufacturer to compete for future 
production opportunities, the vehicles must be able to exchange information via the 
COIN system” (Ervin et al., 2014). The rights to the software and licenses were 
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purchased from the developer Seebyte.  Seebyte, a small foreign company, has continued 
to provide software products for the MK-18 Mod 2 program. 
2. Cost Reduction 
The costs of an acquisition program can change due to a variety of factors, but are 
generally balanced by three overarching items: time, cost, scope. These three aspects of 
the program are interrelated and interdependent. An increase in the scope of a project, the 
amount being produced, or capabilities desired will directly affect the time and cost. 
Every minute of a program’s schedule costs money due to overhead and the intangible of 
reduced capability in the operational environment. The ability to utilize mature 
technology available in the commercial environment can greatly reduce the time and cost 
of a program. In the implementation of MOSA in the ARCI program the benefits of open 
architecture and competition were able to reduce the cost over the lifespan of the program 
by 5:1 (Boudreau, 2006). 
3. Intellectual Property and Peer Review 
The development of competition in the beginning of an acquisition program is key 
to ensuring that it lasts throughout the process. Competition is important throughout the 
program, but with UMS we are speaking to open system architectures that enable 
competition for upgrades during the builds (USD[AT&L], 2015a).The development of 
competition amongst government contractors can be difficult. As highlighted by the 
ARCI case, creating an equitable competition amongst the contractors relied heavily on 
Intellectual Property (IP) rights. The implementation of the ground rules allowing for 
competition and fairness amongst IP are established or inherent in the contracts for the 
builds. The balance of protecting a contractor’s IP while at the same time maintaining an 
open system proved difficult, but ARCI helped to form guidance for this type of 
contracting. The competing solutions proposed for the builds would be demonstrated 
during the OT&E phase, allowing real world feedback. This would enable the best 
solution for each build (Boudreau, 2006). The recent preponderance in civilian UAV 
technology along with the already established UUV contributors should allow a 
competitive environment if the correct business environment can be established.  
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the basic models provided in the DOD Instruction 5000.02 
and identified two that lend themselves to mature technology acquisition that is software 
dominant. The two were analyzed and due to lower risk and level of program 
management throughout the process the Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive 
model was selected for mature technology UMS programs employment, but as stated in 
the DOD Instruction 5000.02 every acquisition program is unique and models can very.  
The Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive was utilized as a possible 
acquisition strategy for a generic UMS program. The use of “builds” throughout the 
incremental process was highlighted as an excellent ability to maintain a capability 
commensurate with technology maturation. The importance of developing competition 
amongst contractors was highlighted. The use of open architecture and fair contracting 
employment in order to protect intellectual property is key to ensuring the desire of 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
With the increase in software and unmanned systems technology the acquisition 
process must continue to evolve and adapt. The use of smaller autonomous vehicles and 
associated technology does not fit easily in the traditional acquisition framework 
developed for B-52s or Destroyers. The shorter lifecycles of UMS platforms and their 
technology enable the continued introduction of capabilities throughout OT&E for the 
benefit of the end users. 
From the research conducted, the delays in the DOD's acquisition process for 
UMS and other weapon systems can be linked to five major problem areas. Key areas for 
improvement are: acquisition workforce and management issues, legislative and 
oversight issues, requirements and funding issues, testing and evaluation issue, and the 
issues of extending from lengthy acquisition timelines. 
While the acquisitions workforce is now more educated in the acquisition 
processes, there are some elements that lack proficiency. Some delays are caused by poor 
cost scheduling and performance, resulting from senior managers and leaders lacking 
experience and understanding of the acquisition process. The acquisition processes are 
bureaucratic and cumbersome. Several approvals are required before authority is granted 
to implement acquisition decision process, which in turn consumes time. The exercise of 
management authority within the DOD is also composed of several complex roles and 
responsibilities, with coordination between these entities difficult and costly. The 
coordination requirements carry over to the legislative and oversight agencies as well. 
The plethora of monitoring bodies and authorities slows down the acquisition process and 
adds to a program’s chance of failure.  
The funding process is an issue for many acquisition programs. Our research 
identified funding as an issue in the ARCI case due to the evolutionary acquisition profile 
that the program was following. The LBS-UUV program, in which the Glider and AUV 
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had to be purchased in two separate increments, also saw issues to due to lack of funding 
and the AUV production has ceased after a single increment.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations can help reduce the DOD's acquisition process 
for the UMS weapons: 
1. Future UMS models should analyze the lessons learned from UMS 
acquisition models applied in this report as well as the ARCI case study. 
The use of multiple “builds” in each increment could help to refine and 
advance the capabilities at a quicker pace throughout the development 
cycle of the program.  
2. Increase the competition for each build/increment. To advance capabilities 
at a quicker pace developers must be driven and at the same time 
protected. The intellectual property of the developers must be protected, 
yet ensure that their product interacts freely with the open architecture. 
The competitors will be more willing to compete for the contracts with 
knowledge of IP protection. This was evidenced in the ARCI case study.  
3. To reduce the time wasted by the oversight activities, the DOD should 
ensure that operations of the several branches are synchronized. However, 
there must be an independent authority to oversee the operations. This 
would greatly reduce the time spent in the approval stage.  
4. While acquisition reformation has made improvements in the process, 
funding remains an issue. This is partly by design of the division between 
executive and legislative branches of government, and the dissolution of 
requirements over time. Future research into innovative, yet practical 
methods of funding UMS-type acquisition programs could be beneficial to 
increase the flexibility as well as increase the program’s chances of 
success.  
The implementation of the recommendations can greatly reduce the costs of UMS 
programs and ensure that the capabilities acquired are as current as possible, and giving 
the end user the best product available. 
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